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Abstract
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game
and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built
into the framework. In particular, we motivate and explore various asym-
metries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that
endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly de-
creases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection
pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this
paper can also help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle re-
garding the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and
receiver in conflict of interest signaling games.
1 Signaling games and evolution
Common interest signaling games were introduced by David Lewis (1969) as a
game theoretic framework which treats communicative conventions as solutions
to coordination problems. In recent years, this has informed a growing body of
work on the evolution of communication, incorporating signaling games into an
evolutionary game theoretic approach to modelling the evolution of communi-
cation and cooperation in humans (Skyrms 2010; Skyrms 1996).
As the basis for such work, David Lewis signaling games are attractive in
their intuitive simplicity and clear outcomes. They are coordination games
between world-observing senders and action-making receivers using costless sig-
nals; in contrast to games where interests may differ and where costly signals
are typically invoked. In the standard two-player, two-state, two-option David
Lewis signaling game (hereafter the ‘2x2x2 game’), the first agent (signaler)
observes that the world is in one of two possible states and broadcasts one of
two possible signals which are observed by the second agent (receiver) who per-
forms one of two possible actions. If the act chosen by the receiver matches
the underlying state of the world, both agents receive a greater payoff than
otherwise.
Most importantly, though, the game theoretic results are unequivocal. There
exist two Nash equilibria that are, in Lewis’s words, signaling systems where
senders condition (otherwise arbitrary) signaling behavior on the state of the
world, and receivers act on those signals so as to secure the mutual payoff. The
two systems only differ on which signal is associated with each state of the
1
world1. Huttegger (2007) and Pawlowitsch (2008) have shown that under cer-
tain conditions a signaling system is guaranteed to emerge under the replicator
dynamics, a standard model of evolution further discussed in section 4.
Of course the degree to which Lewis’ approach makes sense is to some ex-
tent determined by the level of confidence we have in the interpretation and
application of such idealized models to the more complex target systems (such
as animal and human communication). Thus one obvious worry is that by in-
troducing more realistic features into the model, one may break or significantly
dilute previous findings on the evolution of signaling.
Not surprisingly, then, recent work on Lewis signaling games has investi-
gated the many ways in which such de-idealizations could occur, and tested the
robustness of signaling in the face of them. Some deviations from the standard
Lewis signaling game include: more and varied states of the world, the possi-
bility of observational error or signal error, noisy signals, the introduction of a
partial conflict of interest between senders and receivers, the reception of more
than one signal, and so on. Many such concerns are dealt with favourably in
Skyrms (2010), and in work by others. For example Bruner et al. (2014) gen-
eralizes beyond the 2x2x2 case while Godfrey-Smith and Martinez (2013) and
Martinez and Godfrey-Smith (2016) mix signaling games of common interest
and conflict of interest. One result (particularly important for our purposes) is
that signaling systems are not guaranteed in the simple 2x2x2 case when ‘nature
is biased.’ In other words, when the probabilities of the world being in one state
or the other are not equal, a pooling equilibrium in which no communication
occurs between sender and receiver is evolutionarily significant (Huttegger 2007;
Pawlowitsch 2008).
2 Symmetry breaking
Our paper will focus on the idealization that senders and receivers are equally
responsive in strategic settings. Senders and receivers (in the evolutionary treat-
ment of such games) are two populations of highly abstract and constrained
agency roles: all that signalers do upon observing the state of the world is send
a signal, and the receivers chose to act as though the world is in one of the two
possible sender-observable states. Of those two roles, it is the restriction on
receivers which appears to be particularly unrealistic.
Imagine for example a forager sighting a prey animal at a location inaccessi-
ble to her, but close enough to be acquired by an allied conspecific (who cannot
observe the animal). In this case, it is easy for the first forager to slip into
the signaling role and execute it, whistling or gesturing to her counterpart. To
play the receiver role, however, the second forager has to actually re-orient their
attention (to some degree) and attempt to engage in appropriate behavior for
the world-state the first has observed (e.g. prey is to the east or to the west,
etc.).
The Lewis signaling model by design is constrained such that the receiver’s
actions are limited to just those acts associated with the sender’s observed
world-states. It is of course sensible to begin inquiry with as simple of a model
as possible and consider a limited range of responses to stimuli. However, our
1The other two possible outcomes of the game are ‘pooling equilibrium’ which involve the
receiver performing an act unconditionally.
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point is that it is more plausible to make these idealizations for signalers than
for receivers. Signals are (by stipulation) cheap and easy to send, yet the actions
available to the receiver are less plausibly interpreted as intrinsically cheap and
free of opportunity cost.
In addition, the informational states drawn on by sender and receiver are
also likely to be very different. Any real-life sender’s observation of a world state
will likely inform their motivations (‘we should catch that animal’) to dictate
a fairly clear course of action (‘try to direct the other agent’s behavior’). But
all the receiver gets is a whistle, gesture or other signal which (by stipulation)
has no pre-established meaning. The experience of observing a strategically
relevant state of the world will typically be richer and more detailed than that
of observing a strategically relevant artificial signal.
All this leads to two concerns. Firstly, asymmetries in the strategic situations
are likely to exist between senders and receivers. Receivers are likely to have
locally reasonable options available to them other than those relevant to signaler-
observed states of the world, and their responsiveness to the strategic situation is
therefore less satisfactorily modeled by the strictly symmetric payoff structures
of standard signaling games. Call this the structural responsiveness concern.
Secondly, given the likely differences in informational states, goal-directness,
workload and opportunity cost between sender and receiver roles, we can expect
the mechanisms (cognitive and otherwise) which instantiate them to differ as
well, quantitatively and qualitatively. This implies that we should not expect
the update-responsiveness between sender and receiver to be equal either. Yet
the working evolutionary assumption is that senders and receivers update their
strategies in an identical manner, modeled using either learning dynamics or
replicator dynamics. Call this the evolutionary responsiveness concern.
3 Hedgehog strategies and update asymmetry
The first of these concerns might sound like an argument for abandoning co-
ordination games and moving toward ‘conflict of interest’ or ‘partial conflict of
interest’ models. However the issue is more specific than this.
The structural responsiveness concern provides parallel motivation to one of
Kim Sterelny’s (2012) worries about Skyrms’s (2010) use of the Lewis model.
Sterelny asks whether the availability of ‘third options’ on the part of the receiver
might undermine the evolution of signaling even when these third options are
less valuable than the payoff for successful coordination. As part of a discussion
of animal threat responses, he labels this a ‘hedgehog’ strategy for it provides the
agent with an action that pays off modestly regardless of the state of the world.
To make this concrete, hedgehogs often roll into a ball in response to predators.
This is a stark contrast to the more sophisticated behavior of vervets, who have
specific responses to specific threats. Yet the optimal response a vervet takes
to one threat – climb a tree when confronted by a leopard – may lead to total
disaster when used in response to another threat, such as an eagle. Hedgehogs
avoid such outcomes by ‘hedging’ unconditionally so as to secure a modest
payoff. Translated to signaling games, such a gambit may, in many cases, be
more attractive than attempting to respond optimally to a signal2.
2It is worth noting here that the ‘hedgehog’ strategy in this Lewis signaling game is in many
ways analogous to the risk dominant ‘hare’ response in stag hunt games. Playing hare instead
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Sterelny’s ‘hedgehog’ strategy compliments the structural responsiveness
concern: receivers (especially) might have other options of value which will stand
in competition to those assumed in the standard signaling game. Something like
these hedgehog strategies is a plausible departure from the idealization of the
baseline Lewis signaling game and better captures the demandingness of the re-
ceiver role. The question is whether (as Sterelny suspects) including hedgehog
strategies might undermine the evolutionary robustness of signaling systems.
Our second concern pertaining to evolutionary responsiveness parallels a
well-known evolutionary hypothesis: the so-called Red Queen effect. In com-
petitive relationships such as predator-prey or parasite-host, the Red Queen
hypothesis states that species will be constantly adapting and evolving in re-
sponse to one another just to “stay in the same place” (Van Valen 1973). This
should also be the case in competitive signaling situations – such as predator-
prey signaling systems or courtship displays among conspecifics. Signalers and
receivers come to not just update their strategies, but to do so at faster or slower
rates depending on the nature of the strategic encounter they are entwined in3.
It might seem that in David Lewis signaling games (along with games of
common interest more generally) the Red Queen effect should have no role to
play. However any realistic interpretation of the Lewis signaling game makes it
plausible to consider asymmetry in evolutionary responsiveness as likely, if not
the norm. First, as argued, the precise cognitive mechanisms and procedures
employed by senders and receivers are likely to be different. Different systems
(or systems utilized differently) will admit to different degrees of plasticity and
evolvability – and will have a different set of cross-cutting tasks and utilities
exerting distinct demands and pressures. Quick and easy signaling responses
will have different pathways of update and adaptation than the (typically) more
complex set of systems which appropriate receiver responses require. We should
not assume that the evolution of sender and receiver strategies always proceeds
at the same pace.
Finally, there is at least some evidence of a basic asymmetry between sender
and receiver roles in the literature on great ape communication. For example,
Hobaiter and Byrne (2014) stress the great sophistication and flexibility on the
receiver side of Chimpanzee gestural communication, while Seyfarth and Cheney
(2003) discuss about how greater inferential sophistication on the receiver side
is a feature of many primate communication systems. While these findings do
not directly support the structural and evolutionary responsiveness concerns,
they show that real-life sender and receiver strategies (in our near biological
cousins at least) exhibit important differences, suggesting cognitive asymmetries
compatible with those concerns.
In summary then, there is reason to consider two structural modifications
to the Lewis signaling game as especially salient to the issue of responsiveness:
of stag allows the agent to avoid disaster, but only guarantees the individual a mediocre payoff.
Thus the issues and trade-offs associated with the hedgehog strategy are general concerns not
confined to just the Lewis signaling games. Thanks to Kim Sterelny for helping us better see
this connection.
3An example of two groups adapting and evolving at different rates can be found in Richard
Dawkin’s discussion of his famous Life-Dinner principle (Dawkins and Krebs 1979). While
we expect both predator and prey to adapt to each other, Dawkins claims the prey species
will come to evolve at a faster rate than the predator species due to the different selection
pressures exerted on both species. Failing to adapt quickly enough for the predator means
going hungry for an extra day, while failing to adapt for the prey means death.
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the addition of ‘hedgehog’ strategies for receivers, and differing rates of change
in sender and receiver strategies.
4 The model
The evolutionary model we use as the basis for our analysis is the pure-strategy
2x2x2 David Lewis signaling game, with the two-population discrete-time repli-
cator dynamics.
Exact components of the model include two states of the world (L and R),
a world-observing signaler with two possible signals (V1 and V2), and a signal-
observing receiver with two possible actions (AL and AR).
If the receiver’s action matches the state of the world, then both signaler
and receiver get a fixed positive success payoff, otherwise their payoff is zero.
Signalers and receivers both have four pure strategies available to them (see
table 1).
S1 Signal V1 if L and signal V2 if R
S2 Signal V2 if L and signal V1 if R
S3 Signal V1 always
S4 Signal V2 always
S5 Act AL if V1 and act AR if V2
S6 Act AR if V1 and act AL if V2
S7 Act AL always
S8 Act AR always
Table 1: Signaler and receiver strategies in the standard 2x2x2 common interest
signaling game.
For the evolutionary model, the proportions of the different strategies within
sender and receiver populations are initially randomly generated. The fitness
of each strategy at a time period t is determined by the composition of the
opposing population and the payoff associated with each strategy pairing. The
proportion of each strategy at play in the next time period t + 1 is determined
by the standard discrete-time replicator dynamics. For the sender population
this is:
Xi(t + 1) = Xi(t)
FSi
FS
where Xi is the proportion of senders using the ith sender strategy at a given
point in time, FSi is the fitness of that strategy and F
S is the average sender
strategy fitness. Likewise, for receivers:
Yj(t + 1) = Yj(t)
FRj
FR
where Yj is proportion of receivers using the jth receiver strategy, F
R
j is
the average fitness of that strategy and FR is the average receiver strategy
fitness. This is repeated until the populations settle into an evolutionarily stable
arrangement. The update process is deterministic with no randomization or
mutation.
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5 Modifications and results
We introduce two novel modifications to this model. First, we add a ‘hedgehog’
action AH for the receiver. Second, we allow the rate of generational change
of senders and receivers to vary relative to one other. In addition, the bias of
nature is also varied, and we investigate the effects these three departures from
the David Lewis 2x2x2 game have on the evolutionary significance of signaling
systems.
5.1 Hedgehog strategy
Turning to our first modification, the receiver now has three possible actions
upon observing the signal: AL, AR, and AH . As before a success payoff of 1 is
received by both players in the case that the receiver plays AL while the world
is in state L, or the receiver plays AR while the world is in state R. A payoff
of zero is received if AL or AR is played otherwise. A payoff of H is received
unconditionally if the receiver plays AH , where the value of H is between 0 and
1. The sender has four familiar pure strategies, whereas the receiver now has
five (for simplicity we omit conditional strategies involving AH).
To adapt the earlier forager story, we can imagine the sender and receiver
as an egalitarian hunting party, and the game as a situation where the sender
remotely observes the location of a valuable prey animal (left or right) and calls
out to the receiver. The receiver is initially unable to observe the prey but
can choose to go left or go right (catching the prey if they go in the matching
direction), or alternatively to abandon the hunt in order to obtain a less valu-
able resource they do not need help from the sender to acquire (the hedgehog
strategy). Varying the prior probability of the world is equivalent to it being in
a situation where it is systematically more likely that the prey is to the left or
the right.
In the simple unbiased 2x2x2 signaling game, one of the two signaling equilib-
ria is guaranteed to be reached under the replicator dynamics (Huttegger 2007).
In our notation, these equilibria are S1-R1 and S2-R2. Increasing the bias of
the world (i.e. making L more probable than R or vice versa) will undermine
this, with an increasing proportion of populations instead collapsing to pooling
equilibrium. This will occur when there are initially few conditional signaling
strategies (such as S1) in the sender population. In such situations, receivers
do best to simply perform the act that is most appropriate for the more likely
state of the world. The incentive for senders to adopt a signaling system then
disappears and the community is locked into a pooling equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, we find a similar effect with the hedgehog strategy as values
of H, the payoff for AH , become significant. The hedgehog strategy provides
the receiver with an additional unilateral response, and is able to attract some
proportion of initial populations away from the signaling equilibria when H is in
excess of 0.5 (i.e., the average payoff for ‘guessing’). This result, for an unbiased
world, is illustrated in Figure 14.
We observe a more surprising result when the bias and H are varied in
combination. Figure 2 shows the results of varying bias for different values of
4Note that the exact range of this effect, including the point at which the effect becomes
significant and the y-intercept, are artifacts of the number of world-states and strategies in
the model and therefore not general.
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Figure 1: Effect of varying hedgehog payoff H on the number of simulations
reaching signaling equilibria.
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Figure 2: Effect of hedgehog strategy and bias of nature on number of simula-
tions reaching signaling equilibria.
H. As expected, when H is set to zero signaling is guaranteed when nature
is unbiased and is less likely to emerge as bias increases. As before, when
the hedgehog strategy pays significant dividends (H > 0.5) signaling is less
likely when nature is unbiased. For these high values of H, however, increasing
nature’s bias does not immediately reduce the likelihood of signaling. In fact
we observe a ‘plateau’ followed by an increase in signaling behavior, peaking
at the point where bias is equal to the value of H, i.e. at P (L) = H and at
P (L) = 1 − H. Within these bounds, all populations either reach a signaling
equilibrium or a Hedgehog equilibrium (in which all receivers have adopted the
hedgehog strategy) but for values of H outside of this interval traditional pooling
instead occurs when the population fails to reach a signaling convention.
5.2 Generational asymmetry
We now turn to our second modification of the David Lewis signaling framework
in which we introduce a generational asymmetry. We introduced a ‘slow-down
factor’ Z to the replicator dynamics in order to control the rate at which sender
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Figure 3: Effect of generational asymmetry and bias of nature on number of
simulations reaching signaling equilibria.
and receiver populations change over time. Composition of the sender and
receiver populations are now governed by the following equations:
Xi(t + 1) = (1− ZS)Xi(t)F
S
i
FS
+ Xi(t)ZS
Yj(t + 1) = (1− ZR)Yj(t)
FRj
FR
+ Yj(t)ZR
Note that when both ZR = 0 and ZS = 0 the above equations are simply the
standard replicator dynamics. However the rate of change is reduced as these
values are increased; for example setting ZS = .5 halves the rate of change
for sender strategies. Setting ZR to 1 (while holding ZS fixed at 0) means
the composition of the receiver population remains fixed, and only the sender
population is allowed to evolve.
Introducing this generational asymmetry between senders and receivers has
the effect of making signaling more likely when sender strategies evolve faster
than receiver strategies. This is illustrated in figure 3, where, for various levels
of bias, senders (receivers) are slowed down to half and one-tenth speeds while
receivers (senders) are left unaltered.
Slowing the evolution of the sender population leads to more pooling because,
as before, receivers facing a sender population consisting of few conditional sig-
nalers will do best to simply perform that act that is best suited for the more
likely state of the world. As figure 3 illustrates, this effect is more pronounced
for high levels of bias. Slowing the evolution of the receiver population has the
opposite effect. Senders now have time to adopt the best separating strategy
given the initial mix of receiver strategies. Once this occurs, the receiver pop-
ulation slowly responds and the end result is a robust signaling system. By
a similar logic, it is easy to see that a faster-evolving sender population also
mitigates against the effect of receiver hedgehog strategies5
5This also helps to explain the twin-peaked curves in figure 2. In the region of the peaks
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6 Discussion
We have explored a few well-motivated departures from the highly idealized and
simple Lewis signaling game typically considered in the literature. As shown
in section 4, breaking the symmetry between senders and receivers often signif-
icantly reduces the likelihood that a separating equilibrium emerges. For one,
providing receivers with a safe third option which allows them to secure a de-
cent payoff regardless of the state of the world significantly reduces the size of
the basin of attraction of the separating equilibrium. Likewise, separating is a
remote possibility when receivers outpace senders in the race to adapt.
However, the situation is much less bleak when senders evolve at a faster
pace than receivers6. Interestingly, many scholars in the animal communications
literature have noted that such a response asymmetry holds between sender and
receiver when the interests of the parties partially conflict. For instance, Owren,
Rendall, and Ryan (2010) note that senders can easily adapt their signaling
behavior while receivers for the most part have responses to the stimuli produced
by senders that are more difficult to change. This has lead some to the conclusion
that signaling primarily involves the manipulation of receivers by senders.
Yet this leaves us with an evolutionary puzzle. If there is a partial conflict of
interest between sender and receiver, what prevents receivers from increasing the
speed at which they adapt to the behavior of the sender? In other words, what
explains the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver?
Partial conflict of interest settings are the exact circumstances we would expect
the red queen hypothesis to apply. We believe the results of this paper may form
the basis of a novel explanation for this puzzling phenomena. Recall that when
the interests of sender and receiver are perfectly aligned, it is actually in the
interest of both parties for the sender population to ‘take the lead’ and evolve
at the faster rate, as doing so ensures the community is more likely to hit upon
a mutually beneficial signaling system. So in those cases where interactions
between sender and receiver tend to involve little to no conflict, both parties
benefit from the receiver evolving at a snails pace.
We believe this explanation has some intuitive appeal because senders and
receivers who routinely interact rarely find themselves engaged exclusively in
either common or conflict of interest signaling games. As is well known by
any parent, not all signaling interactions between relatives are free of conflict.
Likewise, agents whose interests are typically thought to be partially opposed,
such as two potential mates, may frequently engage in common interest signaling
games in contexts unrelated to mating. The point here is that a variety of
distinct strategic scenarios can hold between sender and receiver. There is no
principled reason to think all interactions will involve the perfect alignment
the uptake rate of the fittest pooling strategy (either hedgehog or traditional) is reduced by
the relatively high fitness of its near rival, as the average fitness FR in the denominator of the
replicator dynamics will be closer to that of the superior FRj strategy. For some populations
(depending on proportions) this competition will allow more time for conditional sending
strategies to tip the fitness balance toward conditional receiving strategies instead.
6This effect is somewhat robust. For instance, Hofbauer and Huttegger (2008) find that
under the selection-mutation dynamics signaling conventions are possible when the mutation
rate of the receiver population exceeds the mutation rate of the sender population. Note that
large mutation rates in effect slow down the rate of evolution of a given population. Thus one
way of interpreting their results is that signaling is likely to occur when the receiver population
is relatively unresponsive to the sender population.
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of interests or sizable conflict, or that communicative strategies will always be
fine-grained enough for scenario-by-scenario optimization.
If this is correct, then when a sizable proportion of interactions between
sender and receiver involve no or very low conflict of interest, the generational
asymmetry result from the previous section may hold to some degree. This will
ensure that both sender and receiver profit when the sender population evolves
at a faster rate than the receiver population. In other words, receivers in this
context do best to limit how responsive they are to senders so as to ensure the
emergence of informative signaling systems in those cases where their interests
do overlap.
The robustness analysis considered in this paper has in some sense shown
how fragile the evolution of signaling can be. Slightly altering the framework in
a sensible fashion leads to significantly different results. While many variants of
the baseline Lewis signaling game have been explored by philosophers in recent
years, more work is required in order to better assess the prospect of signaling
in realistic environments.
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